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I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of immigration law,1 courts generally afford
significant deference to administrative discretion.2 Even consti-
tutional rights are limited in this context.' The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, has extended procedural due process safeguards
to aliens.4 Therefore, courts will occasionally intervene to pro-
1. In the immigration context, judicial review is available only after exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 605 (4th ed. 1994) (citing Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 144-
45 (7th Cir. 1993). Generally, the administrative review process begins with a deci-
sion by an Immigration Judge ("IJ") and, in some instances, a decision by an Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ("INS") officer. Id. at 572. The IJ or INS decision
may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id. The BIA has the
power to review the record de novo, "make its own findings and independently deter-
mine the legal sufficiency of the evidence." Id. at 579 (citing Charlesworth v. INS,
966 F. 2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992)). See also Hazzard v. INS, 951 F.2d 435, 440
n.4 (1st Cir. 1991); Castillo-Rodriguez v. INS, 929 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1991); C6rdoba-
Chdvez v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1991). The Attorney General ("AG") may
review the BIA decision at her own behest or upon request from the BIA or the
INS Commissioner. KURZBAN, supra, at 583.
The major area of federal judicial review of administrative decisions involves
final orders of deportation or exclusion by the BIA. Id. at 593. All agency decisions
or interpretations based on errors of law are subject to plenary review. Id. at 620
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Federal courts, however, are
generally limited to a review of the agency's record and may not decide factual ques-
tions de novo. Id. at 621.
2. See, e.g., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 443 (1985) (indicating that the Attor-
ney General has discretion to refuse suspension of deportation even when all of the
prerequisites are met). In some immigration contexts, the courts use the extremely
deferential "rational basis" standard. See, e.g., Achacosa-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d
1260 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (matter not
reviewable in federal court because committed to agency discretion); Singh v. Moyer,
867 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1989) (denial of waiver pursuant to § 212(e) committed to
agency discretion); Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1986) (decision of Attor-
ney General not to deport someone to the country he or she designates is essentially
non-reviewable).
3. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (finding ex post facto
clause inapplicable in deportation); INS v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)
(exclusionary rule inapplicable in deportation); U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct.
1056 (1990) (limiting the application of the fourth amendment). See also infra part
V.B.
4. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (deciding that an alien's con-
nections to the U.S. need not be "voluntary" before the alien can claim the benefits
of the Constitution); Martinez-Benitez v. INS, 956 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that Board of Immigration Appeals acted arbitrarily in denying refugee alien's
application for asylum based on his conviction of narcotics offense when it failed to
consider facts underlying conviction). Cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
Bridges involved an alien who was deported pursuant to the Alien Registration Act,
which provided for the deportation of any alien who, since entering the U.S., has
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tect the rights of aliens in immigration proceedings. Recently, an
immigration judge ("IJ") denied the petition for waiver of de-
portation5 to a lawful permanent resident ("LPR").8 The IJ
based his decision primarily on the private consensual sexual
conduct of the respondent.' The Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIN') found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the lower
court's ruling.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
been affiliated at any time with an organization that believes in or advocates the
overthrow of the Government by force or violence. The Court held the deportation
unlawful because it was based on literature published by the alien and utterances
made by him. Under these circumstances, stated the Court, the alien's literature and
utterances should be protected by the First Amendment because they did not teach
or advocate the subversive conduct condemned by this statute, they only revealed a
militant advocacy of the cause of trade unionism. Id. at 148. See infra part V.B.
5. This note primarily concerns § 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act. 8 U.S.C. §1182(c). Under this section, the Attorney General may grant discre-
tionary relief from deportation or exclusion to lawful permanent residents who meet
the provision's seven-year residency requirement and whose statutory positive factors
outweigh any negative factors. E.g., Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1365 (9th
Cir. 1993); see infra part III. The distinction between deportable and excludable is
whether or not the alien has made an entry into the United States. An alien may
be deportable once he is considered to have made an entry into the United States
and he may be excludable if he is not considered to have made an entry. For a
more complete legal definition of "entry" and the difference between exclusionary and
deportation proceedings, see generally KURZBAN, supra note 1, at 23-182. For the
applicability of this distinction to 212(c) proceedings, see infra note 20 and accompa-
nying text.
The INS regulations first delegate the authority to make section 212(c) deci-
sions to the Executive Office of Immigration Review and the Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA"). 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0, 3.1(a)(1), 3.1(d)(1) (1993). The administrative agen-
cies then refer responsibility over 212(c) determinations to Immigration Judges
("IJs") and give appellate jurisdiction over those decisions to the BIA. Id. at
§3.1(b)(3). See infra text accompanying notes 20-23. For the factors an IJ must con-
sider in an application for 212(c) relief, see infra text accompanying notes 34-42.
The BIA has the power to review the factual and legal basis of an I's 212(c)
decision de novo. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1366. When federal jurisdiction exists, the
courts must determine the scope of review to be applied in reviewing agency action.
KURZBAN, supra note 1, at 620. The standard of review for a 212(c) proceeding re-
quires examination of agency fact-finding and a determination of whether or not the
findings are supported by substantial evidence. The court must also review the bal-
ancing of the equities underlying a 212(c) determination for an abuse of discretion.
Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1366. Since the BIA did not engage in a de novo review of
the IJ's decision in Yepes-Prado, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the IJ's decision, rather
than reviewing the BIA's determination. Id. at 1367.
6. A lawful permanent resident is defined as one who has "been lawfully ac-
corded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant
in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(20).
7. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1993).
8. Id.
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however, vacated the judgment, holding that the IJ abused his
discretion by improperly considering such conduct. The Ninth
Circuit specifically stated:
[B]y considering the irrelevant factors of the legal status of
Yepes-Prado's relationship with Saavedra and her refusal to
marry him, as well as the "illegitimacy" of Yepes-Prado's
children, the IJ based his decision on unreasonable and im-
proper factors rather than on legitimate concerns about the
administration of the immigration laws.'
This note examines the circuit court's decision in Yepes-
Prado v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,'° focus-
ing on the issue of privacy. The court, perhaps for the first time
in immigration jurisprudence, analyzes the constitutional right
to privacy and applies it to an immigration proceeding. After
Yepes-Prado, it is the law in the Ninth Circuit that "private
sexual conduct between consenting adults" is not a legitimate
consideration in a hearing for waiver of deportation." If the
Supreme Court reviews and affirms this decision, 2 it would
extend this right to privacy beyond the Ninth Circuit to all juris-
dictions in the United States. This extension would signify some
progress in affording basic rights to immigrants in the United
States.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
admitted Rigoberto Yepes-Prado into the United States as an
LPR on November 29, 1974."3 For the next ten years, Yepes-
Prado maintained steady employment and was a law-abiding
citizen." In April 1984, however, he was arrested for possession
of 14.25 grams of heroin with intent to sell. 5 A California court
convicted him on January 15, 1986, and sentenced him to one
9. Id. at 1370.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1368.
12. At the time of publication, neither party has petitioned for Supreme Court
review. The remand of the case resulted in confusion and delay. See infra part VI.
13. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1993).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1363.
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year in the county jail and two years probation.' Yepes-Prado
served eight months in jail. Thereafter, he was released on pro-
bation. 7
Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act § 241
("INA"), the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
ordered Yepes-Prado to show cause why he should not be de-
ported given his drug conviction. INA § 241 provides, inter alia,
that any alien who is convicted of violating any law related to
the possession or trafficking of illegal narcotics "shall" be deport-
ed.'" Although Yepes-Prado had a legal right to a hearing to
show cause why he should not be deported, 9 this was not a
practical option, given his drug conviction. He conceded his de-
portability, and instead sought discretionary relief under INA §
212(c).2'
The IJ denied the waiver,2' primarily because Yepes-Prado
is the father of three illegitimate children who continued his
sexual relationship with the children's mother without marrying
her.' On appeal to the BIA, the Board determined that the IJ
did not abuse his discretion, despite its finding that Yepes-Prado
had "outstanding equities."' The Ninth Circuit vacated the
judgment and remanded the case,' holding that the IJ did
abuse his discretion by considering the private sexual conduct of
Yepes-Prado as an adverse factor.25 The Court also determined,
as an alternate holding, that the IJ "failed to offer a reasoned
explanation of why the only adverse factor, the single drug con-
viction, outweighed all of the equities in Yepes-Prado's favor."
26
16. Id. at 1365.
17. Id. at 1372.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988).
19. 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1) (1988).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988). On its face, the statute applies only to excludable
LPRs seeking to re-enter the country, but case law has established that a 212(c)
waiver is also available in deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of Silva, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 26, No. 2532 (1976). The requirement remains, however, that the grounds
for deportation would also make the LPR excludable if he had departed and sought
re-entry. Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec., No. 3147 (1990). See supra
note 6.
21. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1993).
22. Id. at 1367-68.
23. Id. at 1365 (presumably quoting to the BIA decision although no citation is
provided in the circuit court's opinion).
24. Id. at 1373. The circuit court has jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1105(a).
25. Id. at 1370.
26. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in origi-
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952. INA § 212(c), the provision under which Yepes-
Prado sought relief, was part of the 1952 Act. Various amend-
ments and judicial and administrative decisions, however,
shaped the waiver provision into what it is today.27 In its pres-
ent form, § 212(c) is available as a discretionary waiver of depor-
tation for LPRs in deportation proceedings who meet certain
requirements." Among other requirements,29 the alien cannot
be deported unless the alien, for the same reasons, could also be
excluded if he was at the border attempting to enter the United
States. ° Furthermore, the LPR must have been domiciled in
the U.S. for at least seven years.3 ' The most recent legislative
change, the Immigration Reform Act of 1990,2 significantly
altered the eligibility requirements for § 212(c) relief, but had no
effect on the eligibility of Yepes-Prado.
In Matter of Marin, the BIA set forth the factors an IJ shall
consider in an application for § 212(c) relief.34 The adverse fac-
tors include:
the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion
ground at issue,' the presence of additional significant vio-
lations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a
nal).
27. See generally, Carlina Tapia-Ruano, Recent Developments in 212(c) Cases,
422 PRACTISING L. INST. 991 (Nov.-Dec. 1991). For a thorough, yet concise, discussion
of waiver of deportation under 212(c), see KURZBAN, supra note 1, at 560-66.
28. See generally Tapia-Ruano, supra note 27.
29. Such requirements are outside the scope of this note; however, see infra
notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 6.
31. Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (effective Nov. 29, 1990). See
generally Michelle J. Anderson, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status
on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L. J. 1401 (1993). Most significantly, 212(c) relief
was previously barred for aliens sentenced to five years or more in prison for an
aggravated felony; the new provision requires that the alien actually serve the time
in prison. The new definition also expanded the definition of aggravated felony. Id.
33. Yepes-Prado's crime fits the definition of aggravated felony, but he was not
sentenced to the requisite five years.
34. 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (1978).
35. In the instant case, for example, the IJ must consider Yepes-Prado's heroin
conviction.
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criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and serious-
ness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of a
respondent's bad character or undesirability as a permanent
resident of this country.3"
These negative factors are balanced against the respondent's
presentation of favorable considerations, 7 including:
such factors as family ties within the United States, resi-
dence of long duration in this country (particularly when the
inception of residence occurred while the respondent was of
young age), evidence of hardship to the respondent and fami-
ly if deportation occurs, service in this country's Armed Forc-
es, a history of employment, the existence of property or
business ties, evidence of value and service to the community,
proof of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and
other evidence attesting to a respondent's good character
(e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible commu-
nity representatives)."
An alien who makes an outstanding showing of favorable
factors "merely satisfies the threshold test for having a favorable
exercise of discretion considered in his case; such a showing does
not compel that discretion be exercised in his favor." 9 The IJ
must go through the process of weighing the relevant factors in
each individual case.' He cannot undermine the availability of
§ 212(c) waivers through a blanket denial of such waivers for all
drug cases.4 1 The determination must be made on a case-by-
case basis.4 2
IV. THE CASE OF YEPES-PRADO
The circuit court determined that the IJ made two distinct
errors, and it analyzed each error independently.3 This Note
36. Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. at 584.
37. Id. at 585.
38. Id. at 584-85.
39. Matter of Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec, 628, 634 (1988).
40. See Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec., No. 3134, (1990) (denying an ap-
plication for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993).
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considers each of the court's holdings separately. The court's
first and most important holding extends the right of privacy to
§ 212(c) hearings by eliminating private sexual conduct as a
proper factor for consideration. This holding on its own is suffi-
cient to support the court's decision. The second holding reflects
the court's perception that the IJ failed to offer a reasoned ex-
planation for his decision. The court's analysis, however, is in-
complete on this alternate holding, since it fails to account for
all the factors the IJ considered. The reasoned explanation issue
will be discussed first, leaving the more important privacy issue
for a more thorough discussion.
A. A Reasoned Explanation
The circuit court held that the IJ "failed to offer a reasoned
explanation of why the only adverse factor, the single drug con-
viction, outweighed all of the equities in Yepes-Prado's favor.""
The circuit court derives authority for this holding from Dragon
v. INS,4" which held that in an abuse of discretion hearing, the
IJ must explain which factors he examines and how he reaches
a determination on whether to suspend deportation."
The circuit court states that the drug conviction is the "only"
adverse factor the IJ considered. If this were true, its holding on
this issue would be sound, particularly in light of Congress' deci-
sion to allow a case-by-case analysis where drug offenders re-
questing § 212(c) relief serve less than five years prison time.47
44. Id.
45. 748 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1984).
46. The Yepes.Prado court interprets Dragon to say that in an abuse of dis-
cretion hearing, the reviewing court must examine two elements to determine wheth-
er the IJ abused his discretion. First, did the IJ "consider expressly all relevant
factors presented . . . "; and second, did the IJ "issue a reasoned decision reflecting
such deliberation." In determining whether a reasoned decision is present, "the agen-
cy must indicate 'how it weighed the factors involved' and 'how it arrived at its con-
clusion.' Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1370.
The policy behind this "test" is to avoid decisions being reached in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner. "Agencies abuse their discretion no less by arriving at
plausible decisions in an arbitrary fashion than by reaching unreasonable results."
Id. (quoting Israel, 785 F.2d at 740 n. 1, quoting San Seup Shin v. INS, 750 F.2d
122, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
47. Congress in the 1990 Immigration Reform Act, supra note 42, specifically
made known its intent to weigh drug convictions with less than five year's time
served on a case-by-case basis. The Circuit Court in Yepes-Prado points out that:
[Vol. 25:3628
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In the case-by-case analysis the IJ should "consider the relative
seriousness of the particular conduct of which the petitioner was
convicted."' Thus, to the extent that the court faulted the IJ
for failing to consider the specific circumstances of Yepes-Prado's
drug conviction,49 it was correct.
The court, however, ignores the fact that the IJ considered,
in a reasoned and calculated manner, Yepes-Prado's sexual con-
duct as an adverse factor. Whether or not the reasons for grant-
ing a § 212(c) waiver are proper is a separate issue from wheth-
er or not the reasons are given. By ignoring the IJ's consider-
ation of private sexual conduct, the court creates a fiction that
the drug conviction is the only adverse factor examined by the IJ
and criticizes the IJ for being conclusory. This reasoning is
flawed. The court concludes in the first part of the decision'
that private sexual conduct is not a legitimate factor to be
weighed in a § 212(c) waiver hearing. Once the court reaches
this conclusion, it eliminates private sexual conduct as a factor
in deciding whether the IJ abused his discretion when he
weighed the adverse factors.
The court highlights this flaw, stating, "[tihere is no ques-
tion that the IJ gave significant weight to the fact that Yepes-
Prado and the mother of his children, Maria Saavedra, were not
married ... [Tihe same is true with respect to the fact that
[they] continued to have a sexual relationship out of wedlock."51
In failing to acknowledge private sexual conduct as a factor
with regard to the abuse of discretion, the court fails to consider
that the IJ may have based his decision primarily on this factor
Congress could have decided to deny discretionary relief to all persons
convicted of serious drug offenses, but it explicitly chose not to do so. In-
stead, by providing that 212(c) relief will remain available to persons
such as Yepes-Prado, who have served less than five years imprisonment
on account of a narcotics conviction, Congress demonstrated its intent
that the Attorney General should consider these applications on a case-
by-case basis, while carefully weighing all pertinent considerations, in-
cluding the particulars of the petitioner's conduct.
Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1371.
48. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1993).
49. The specific circumstances include: (1) Yepes-Prado had no prior criminal
record, (2) he was sentenced to one year and served only eight months, (3) there
was no evidence that he violated his parole, (4) there was no evidence of subsequent
criminal acts, and (5) he attended a rehabilitation program.
50. See infra part W.B.
51. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1368.
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and not the drug conviction. This is evidenced by the IJ's em-
phasis on Yepes-Prado's behavior.52
The court does not address the issue of whether the IJ gave
a reasoned explanation of how he weighed the improper factor,
private sexual conduct. Assuming, arguendo, that the private
sexual conduct is a proper factor to consider, the decision to
deny relief would then be an acceptable exercise of discretion.
The IJ only needs to give a reasoned explanation of how such
conduct outweighed the factors in Yepes-Prado's favor.
B. Private Sexual Conduct
The holding that an IJ should not consider private sexual
conduct as a factor in a § 212(c) deportation relief hearing sets
an unprecedented standard. At least in the Ninth Circuit, the
practicing immigration attorney can now rely on Yepes-Prado to
prevent an adverse ruling based solely on the private sexual con-
duct of his client.
The circuit court in Yepes-Prado makes creative and effi-
cient use of precedent to justify its decision. In its analysis, the
court separates the fact that Yepes-Prado was not married to
the mother of his children from the fact that he maintained a
sexual relationship out of wedlock.53 With regard to the illegiti-
macy of the children, the court cites Vargas v. INS' for the
proposition that the court's explanation must be based on "legiti-
mate" concerns.55 Vargas, however, does not define what consti-
tutes a legitimate concern. The court does not cite to any other
case for the direct proposition that having illegitimate children
is not a legitimate concern.
56
52. The circuit court states:
The IJ complained:
And, he was told by me, last time, to regularize his relationship
with a woman, by whom he's had three children and a fourth on the
way, and he comes back single.
Doesn't the Catholic Church also teach you that you [sic]
supposed to be married before you start having children?
How come you didn't follow those rules?
Id.
53. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993).
54. 831 F.2d 906 (9th Cir 1987).
55. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1368 (citing" Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d at
909)(emphasis in original).
56. It is not one of the factors set forth in Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec.
630 [Vol. 25:3
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For a closer analogy, the circuit court cites to Matter of
Anrade.57 In a concurring opinion in Anrade, one member of the
BIA stated that an IJ should not consider "factors such as per-
sonal living arrangements" in a bond hearing." As mere dicta
in a similar immigration context, Anrade alone does not provide
a very powerful argument. The court strengthens its argument
with support from a non-immigration case, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.59 In Moore, the Supreme Court held that freedom of
choice in marriage and family matters fits within the definition
of liberty for purpose of the Due Process Clause. ° From this
case the circuit court concludes that family matters such as the
illegitimacy of Yepes-Prado's children are constitutionally pro-
tected.61 Therefore, the IJ erred when he considered the famil-
ial situation of Yepes-Prado and the BIA erred when it upheld
that decision.
With regard to Yepes-Prado's sexual relationship out of
wedlock, the circuit court derives from case law outside the
immigration context that "[private sexual conduct between
consenting adults cannot be considered as a negative factor in
an INS proceeding... absent specific congressional authoriza-
tion." 2 The court cites Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong' for the
proposition that noncitizens may be subjected to different rules
than citizens only where Congress has specifically enacted legis-
lation authorizing such discrimination." Hampton involved the
581 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
57. Interim Dec. No. 3037, 1987 WL 108952 (1987).
58. id. at *9.
59. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (involving a home owner who was convicted in an Ohio
court of violating an East Cleveland housing ordinance which limited occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single family and recognized as a "family" only a few
categories of related individuals).
60. Case law has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment applies to deportable
aliens. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S.
228 (1896).
61. For a general discussion about contemporary America's changing views on
the family and how that affects the legal rights of unmarried couples, see David G.
Richardson, Family Rights for Unmarried Couples, 2 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 117
(1993).
62. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993).
63. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding that Civil Service Commission regulations ex-
cluding non-citizens from employment in most federal civil service positions did not
satisfy due process requirements where the government could not prove a legitimate




exclusion of noncitizens from federal civil service jobs.'
Hampton is not directly analogous to the present case because it
involves the disparate treatment of non-citizens versus citizens.
Here, no such disparate treatment is at issue because citizens
are not deportable. Hampton is, however, illustrative of the fact
that LPRs are entitled to some forms of due process.
The circuit court illustrates the general principle that "pri-
vate consensual sexual activity is an important aspect of person-
al identity"" through additional case law. The court cites
Eisenstadt v. Baird67 and Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l.,"
from the line of cases following Griswold v. Connecticut,69 ad-
dressing the constitutionality of state regulation of contracep-
tives. In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court concluded, "[ilf the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."7" In Carey, the Supreme
Court reached the conclusion that "the teaching of Griswold is
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State."7
Since Yepes-Prado is the father of three illegitimate chil-
dren, it seems disingenuous to argue that his sexual activity is
not a matter of childbearing.72 The Eisenstadt decision explic-
itly extended the right to privacy in matters of childbearing to
unmarried individuals.73 If choice in marriage" and family
matters75 are liberty interests for due process analysis, so too
must childbearing be a liberty interest." This reasoning gives
65. Id.
66. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1368.
67. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
68. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
71. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
72. Not at issue here is the question of whether the holding in this case could
be extended to include homosexual activity, since as a practical matter, homosexuali-
ty is not a matter of childbearing. The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), tends to indicate that such a result is unlikely. See
infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
73. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
74. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
75. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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substantial support to the circuit court's conclusion that an IJ
should not inquire into such matters without specific congressio-
nal authority.7
The circuit court derives further support for its decision
from collateral changes to Title 8 of the U.S. Code, from
which it infers lack of congressional intent. The Immigration
Reform Act of 1990," for example, removes sexual deviancy
and polygamy from the grounds for exclusion.' These changes
indicate, as the court correctly implies, that it is no longer
Congress' intention for "private sexual conduct among consent-
ing adults [to] be considered a legitimate basis for making immi-
gration decisions."8
V. ANALYSIS
A. Private Sexual Conduct as a Privacy Right
The circuit court in Yepes-Prado relied heavily on case law
outside of the immigration context, particularly the progeny of
Griswold v. Connecticut.' Although the court does not reach
the question of whether it would be constitutional for the gov-
ernment to punish private sexual conduct, the court cites these
cases for the proposition that inquiry into such activity is subject
77. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State did not have
authority to promulgate regulations denying passports, to Communists and to per-
sons whom evidence showed were going abroad to further Communist causes, or a
regulation giving authority to demand a non-Communist affidavit from a citizen
applying for a passport). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)
(holding that Civil Service Commission regulations excluding non-citizens from em-
ployment in most federal civil service positions did not satisfy due process require-
ments where the government could not prove a legitimate basis for presuming that
the regulation served its asserted overriding national interest).
78. 8 USC § 1, et seq.
79. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (effective Nov. 29, 1990). See
supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
80. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1369 (citing Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1990) (effective Nov. 29, 1990)). The court also indicates that "{iln 1981 Congress
repealed the statutory subsection that provided that adultery disqualified an appli-
cant from being found to possess good moral character." Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 97-
116, §2(c), 95 Stat. 1611 (1981) (effective Dec. 29, 1981)).
81. Id.
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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to the requirements of due process.' The court bases its hold-
ing on this due process argument, for had it reached the issue of
the constitutional right to privacy, a different result seems like-
ly. The constitutional right to privacy is far from absolute in a
wholly domestic context."' It is unlikely that the court would
extend that right in the context of immigration law further than
it has in a domestic context.
There is no affirmative grant of a right to privacy in the
U.S. Constitution.85 The Court in Griswold creatively crafts this
right from various constitutional provisions." Subsequent deci-
sions expand the right to privacy. It is also clear, however,
that the right to privacy is limited in scope," and courts fre-
quently decline to extend it further. One legal analyst com-
ments:
Since heterosexual fornication and adultery are widely
criminalized, and heterosexual sodomy can be
criminalized. . . the essence of constitutionally protected
sexual privacy may be limited to consenting, private penile-
vaginal intercourse between persons married to each other,
with or without contraception. That is not very much prog-
ress in the quarter of a century since Griswold.'
83. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 85-101. See also infra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text.
85. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7,
at 389-90 (4th ed. 1991). Nowak and Rotunda, in commenting on Griswold privacy,
state: "[tihe justices have selected a group of individual rights which do not have a
specific textual basis in the Constitution or its amendments and deemed them to be
'fundamental.' Id. at 390.
86. The Court's analysis included the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & RALPH S. TYLER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 11.3, at 775 (2d ed. 1988).
One analyst comments: "[Justice] Douglas found that the right of privacy was
there in the Constitution all along, created as a penumbra by emanations from spe-
cific provisions of the original Bill of Rights . . . . like the spaghetti sauce
pitchperson telling us that 'It's in there,' Douglas is claiming that the right of priva-
cy is in the Constitution itself." Rodney J. Blackman, Spinning, Squirreling, Shelling,
Stiletting and Other Stratagems of the Supremes, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 503, 520 (1993).
87. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Services,
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
88. See Millspaugh v. Wabash County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 746 F. Supp. 832,
848 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
89. Richard Green, Griswold's Legacy: Fornication and Adultery as Crimes, 16
OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 549 (1989).
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The Court's most notorious opportunity to expand the right
of privacy occurred in Bowers v. Hardwick," wherein a homo-
sexual plaintiff challenged Georgia's anti-sodomy law. In Bow-
ers, the Court held that the statute was constitutional. 91 The
Court distinguished the right to privacy protected in Griswold
and its progeny,92 indicating that the respondent demonstrated
"[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation...
and homosexual activity."" This did not, however, indicate by
negative implication that there is an absolute right to privacy in
family, marriage, and procreation, but only that some right to
privacy exists in those limited contexts. 94
It appears that outside of the marriage bed there is little
right to privacy with regard to consensual sexual activity. Al-
though some states repealed statutes that proscribe fornication
and adultery, many still have statutes that impose criminal
penalties for either or both of these crimes involving private
consensual sexual activity. 95 Some states specifically prohibit
unlawful cohabitation, which the New Mexico statute defines as
"persons who are not married to each other cohabiting together
as man and wife."98 The U.S. Supreme Court has not held that
state prohibitions of these activities are unconstitutional. The
"crimes" of fornication and cohabitation, however, are directly
analogous to the activities which the circuit court in Yepes-Prado
concluded were improper factors for the IJ to consider in a waiv-
90. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
91. The issue of whether the statute is constitutional as applied to heterosexu-
als who are married was disposed of without resolution. A claim regarding a mar-
ried couple, John and Mary Doe, was deemed non-justiciable for lack of standing in
the District Court because the married plaintiffs had not yet been arrested or
charged with a violation of the statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Does
did not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202 (l1th Cir. 1985).
92. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The Court describes the line of cases construed by
the circuit court to confer a right of privacy protecting homosexual sodomy, includ-
ing, inter alia, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. Id. at 191.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2(344) (Michie 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76(7)(104) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 16(6)(19) (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16(15)(60)
(Law. Co-op. 1991).
96. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30(10)(2) (Michie 1993). See also, N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1(20)(10) (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97(29)(1) (1991).
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er of deportation hearing.
Issues related to cohabitation and fornication are often con-
sidered in child custody cases. In this context, an individual's
right to privacy is more limited. In Jarrett v. Jarrett,97 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court held it was proper for the trial court to
transfer custody of the children from the mother to the father
where the mother cohabitated with her boyfriend, notwithstand-
ing "the absence of any evidence of contemporaneous adverse
effect upon the minor children."98 The court applied a standard
of conduct inferred from the state statute proscribing fornica-
tion.9
In Parrillo v. Parrillo,°° the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reached a similar result, although there was no statutory prohi-
bition to fornication in that state. The court in Parrillo upheld
the trial court's order that the mother "forgo any overnight visi-
tations with [her boyfriend] on those occasions when the chil-
dren are present."10' The private sexual conduct restricted by
the Parrillo court in the child custody context is closely analo-
gous to the conduct which the circuit court in Yepes-Prado held
that the IJ improperly considered.
There is, of course, a major distinction between child custo-
dy cases and deportation hearings. In child custody cases the
court's primary concern is to do what is in the best interest of
the child. This is not the primary goal in a waiver of deportation
hearing. In the deportation context, the primary objective is to
make a fair determination about an alien's desirability. During
this process there is a balancing of concerns where the interests
of the alien's children are weighed as one of many other fac-
tors. 2 Where deportation of an alien will have an adverse
effect upon his children, therefore, the IJ should give more
weight to the children's needs and the existence of a family
unit.' This would be consistent with the state's interest in
97. 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979).
98. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
99. The court cites the relevant portion of the statute: '[ainy person who co-
habits or has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if
the behavior is open and notorious." Id. at 424 (citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, par.
11-8 (1977)).
100. 554 A.2d 1043 (R.I. 1989).
101. Parrillo, 554 A.2d at 1045.
102. See supra text accompanying note 38.
103. Immigration law recognizes this fact in that "[a] family relationship is to be
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the welfare of children, even where there is no formal legitimiza-
tion, as is the situation with Yepes-Prado and his children.
There are other areas of the law that permit governmental
intrusion into private sexual conduct. In Shawgo v.
Spradlin, °4 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held a state civil service regulation which penalized police offi-
cers who cohabitated or became romantically involved with other
officers in the department. 5 Shawgo indicates that regula-
tions which restrict private sexual consensual conduct are able
to survive federal due process analysis when applied to civil ser-
vants.
10 6
On policy grounds, one could justify the BIA's holding in
Yepes-Prado based on the view that the consideration of an ac-
tivity, when applied to a resident alien who is deportable, should
be permissible where substantially similar activity is prohibited
for civil servants, most of whom are United States citizens. In
Shawgo, the court opined that the civil service regulation did
not give adequate notice as to exactly what conduct was subject
to sanction, but nevertheless found that the regulation did not
offend the Constitution. 7 Similarly, there is no statute, regu-
lation, or case law specifically proscribing private consensual
sexual activity from which Yepes-Prado could have received
notice that private consensual sexual activity is considered in a
§ 212(c) waiver of deportation hearing. However, the circuit
court in Yepes-Prado held that the IJ's consideration of such fac-
tors was improper.'0
These non-immigration cases collectively demonstrate that
courts may properly consider private consensual sexual conduct
in certain restricted and well-defined areas of the law. The hold-
ing in Yepes-Prado indicates that a hearing for waiver of depor-
tation of a deportable alien is not one of these areas.
counted as a positive factor in determining whether to grant 212(c) relief." Yepes-
Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993).
104. 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 477-79.
108. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1369.
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B. The Constitutional Rights of Aliens
Beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. immigration courts, many of
the constitutional rights and privileges which protect United
States citizens also apply to aliens."° As long ago as 1886, the
Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins"° stated:
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined
to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.' These provisions are univer-
sal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is
a pledge of the protection of equal laws."'
The Yick Wo decision was in a strictly domestic context which
has no direct bearing on immigration law, but it is significant
because it unequivocally establishes that the constitution affords
at least some protection to aliens within the borders of the Unit-
ed States.
More recently, the Court in Graham v. Richardson"' held
that a state could not place restrictions on access to welfare for
lawful aliens."' In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,"" the Court
opined that "the federal power over aliens is [not] so plenary
that any agent of the National Government may arbitrarily sub-
ject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those
applied to citizens.""5 On the same day, the Court handed
down its decision in Mathews v. Diaz,"' wherein the Court
109. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that Fifth
Amendment rights apply to all persons, not only to citizens).
110. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Court in Yick Wo struck down a San Francisco
ordinance that was constitutional on its face but was being applied in such a man-
ner that it prevented Chinese nationals from operating laundries, while permitting
others to operate substantially identical laundries. Id.
111. Id. at 369. See also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (ex-
tending constitutional criminal procedure to aliens).
112. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
113. Id.
114. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
115. Id. at 101.
116. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). In Mathews, resident aliens challenged the constitution-
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stated:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of
the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons
from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law. Even one whose presence in this country is un-
lawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitu-
tional protection."7
The Court further explains that the United States Constitution
does not confer all the advantages of citizenship to aliens, and
that "a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may
justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the
other.""' These constitutional cases indicate that certain provi-
sions of the United States Constitution extend to protect aliens
within our borders. 19 Some provisions of the Constitution,
however, do not extend to aliens as they would to United States
citizens. 20 In the immigration context, Constitutional protec-
tion is at its weakest and government interests begin to take on
a greater importance.1
21
ality of the Social Security Act provision which denies eligibility to aliens for enrol-
ment in the Medicare part B supplemental medical insurance program unless they
have been admitted for permanent residence and have also resided in the U.S. for
five years. Id. at 77. While the Supreme Court did uphold this provision, it stated
that the Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, protects aliens, including
those whose presence in the U.S. is unlawful, involuntary or transitional, from depri-
vation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Id.
117. Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 78. The challenged statute not only distinguished between aliens and
citizens, but also distinguished between different classes of aliens. The statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1395(2)(B), denied eligibility for Medicare to aliens who have not been ad-
mitted for permanent residency and have not met a five year residency requirement.
The statute was upheld because the Court determined that the requirements fur-
thered the legitimate state interest of limiting Medicare to individuals who had
established sufficient ties to the United States. Id.
See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (wherein the Court struck down a
Texas statute that prevented the children of undocumented aliens from attending
public school on equal protection grounds, thereby extending equal protection to
undocumented aliens' children).
119. See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 67.
120. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding ex post facto
clause inapplicable in deportation); U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(holding that a nonresident alien has no Fourth Amendment right to prevent a
search and seizure of property located outside the territory of the United States);
Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding Bill of Attainder clause inap-
plicable in deportation).
121. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
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C. The Right to Privacy in the Immigration Context
There is a paucity of literature and case law concerning the
right to privacy in the immigration context. Apparently, no court
ever recognized such a right before the court in Yepes-Prado
eliminated private sexual conduct as a factor for consideration in
a waiver of deportation hearing. The limited constitutional
rights that the courts extended to aliens through various judicial
decisions do not by their terms extend to immigration. 122 Nor
do the rights extended to aliens necessarily include the right of
privacy either directly or indirectly through the reasoning of
Griswold, particularly since some of the constitutional provisions
from which the Griswold opinion derived the right to privacy do
not protect aliens.
123
There is no case that is directly analogous to the situation
in Yepes-Prado. The Court in Fiallo v. Bell" did not consider
the privacy issue when holding that the government could dis-
criminate against unwed fathers in determining special prefer-
ence immigration status. Matter of Marin,"25 which enunciated
various factors which a court may consider in the determination
of whether or not to grant a § 212(c) waiver, did not affirmative-
ly or negatively incorporate privacy considerations. Although the
circuit court in Yepes-Prado does not purport to create a right to
privacy, its holding that an IJ cannot consider private consensu-
al sexual conduct recognizes what is tantamount to a "right"
where none existed before.
D. How far will Yepes-Prado Go?
Assuming that Yepes-Prado is not an illusion, and has, in
fact, planted the seed of a right to privacy in immigration, it is
U.S. 580 (1952).
122. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 119.
124. 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (wherein three sets of unwed natural fathers and their
illegitimate offspring brought an action to permanently enjoin the enforcement of
those sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act which have the effect of ex-
cluding the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father, as
opposed to his natural mother, from the special preference immigration status ac-
corded a "child" or "parent" of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident).
125. 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (1978).
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unlikely that this seed will grow and mature at a rapid rate. It
has taken twenty-nine years for Griswold privacy to gain its
first foothold in the immigration context, so there is no reason to
believe that it will rapidly expand from here. It is also likely
that privacy in the immigration context will face considerable
resistance from conservative judges in other circuits as well as
from the Justices on the Supreme Court. Even within the Ninth
Circuit, it is uncertain whether this newly established precedent
will be strictly limited to its facts or construed broadly to encom-
pass other areas of private sexual conduct. It is not clear, for
example, whether or not this holding would apply to private
consensual homosexual activity.12
There is some evidence that the BIA is leaning toward the
recognition of homosexual rights. In Matter of Toboso,127 the
BIA found that the imprisonment for interrogation and medical
examination of a homosexual on the grounds that he was gay
constitutes persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group for political asylum purposes. In Matter of
Tenorio," an IJ in San Francisco reached a similar decision
with regard to a homosexual who was attacked and left for dead
by a death squad who used anti-gay epithets while attacking
him. These cases do not address the privacy issue directly, but
indicate an increased tolerance for homosexuals which could
extend the Yepes-Prado holding to homosexuals in a waiver of
deportation proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Yepes-Prado, the circuit court relies on precedent in a
subtle and effective exercise of judicial activism to create new
law. No statute expressly forbids the consideration of private
sexual conduct in § 212(c) cases, nor does any previous decision
declare that such conduct cannot be considered as legitimate
126. It is not clear whether or not homosexuality would be a factor for the IJ to
consider under the Marin standard. It may fit under the category of "other evidence
indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident
of this country." Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (1978).
127. No. A23-220-644, slip op. (BIA 1990) (non-precedential decision). The dissent
cited Bowers v. Hardwick and argued that the imprisonment constituted an investi-
gation of criminal activity.
128. No. A72-093-558 (IJ 1993).
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grounds for denial of a discretionary waiver.
There is no indication at the present time that this case will
reach the Supreme Court. If it does, the Court will have the
opportunity to extend Griswold privacy to immigration. It seems
unlikely, however, that the current Court, top heavy with politi-
cally conservative Reagan-Bush appointees,1 21 will take that
course of action. Whether or not that happens, it is likely that
some case will eventually reach the Supreme Court on this is-
sue, at which time the Court may overrule the holding in Yepes-
Prado. For the time being, however, the Ninth Circuit has effec-
tively created a right to privacy with regard to consensual sexu-
al conduct where no right existed before, at least in the context
of waiver of deportation hearings.
CHARLES J. SEAMAN*
129. Although "politically conservative" is usually associated with less govern-
ment restrictions, the reverse seems to be true in the two particular areas relevant
to this discussion: personal freedom and immigration.
* J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Miami School of Law.
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